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Abstract This paper investigates the price and output effects of the US Airways and 
American Airlines merger in markets in which actual or potential competition was 
eliminated. In markets in which actual competition was eliminated, the results are mixed. 
The merger is procompetitive (lower prices and higher output) in nonstop markets in 
which both endpoints are major hubs of merging airlines, but anticompetitive in 
connecting markets. Where potential competition was eliminated, the results are 
consistent with significant price increases and output reductions, particularly when the 
potential competitor was US Airways.   
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1    Introduction 
The merger between US Airways (US) and American Airlines (AA) in 2013 was initially 
challenged by federal antitrust authorities because it was considered harmful to market 
competition. According to the US Department of Justice (DOJ), the merger would eliminate 
significant actual and potential competition between the airlines and would most likely lead to 
higher prices and lower output (DOJ 2013). Even though this merger was ultimately approved 
on the condition that the airlines gave up slots and gates at certain airports to other, low-cost 
carriers1 (LCCs), it is not clear whether the adverse impact on price and output from the loss 
of actual and potential competition was alleviated. This paper investigates the price and 
output effects of the US/AA merger in markets in which actual or potential competition was 
eliminated. 
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1 Several studies have documented stronger competitive effects of LCCs’ market presence and entry 
than of network airlines’ market presence and entry (Morisson 2001; Kwoka, Hearle, and Alepin 
2016). 
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Retrospective analyses of airline mergers tend to focus only on the price effects in markets 
in which the airlines previously competed (Jain 2015; Luo 2014). This paper differs in three 
aspects that could potentially allow it to provide additional insights into the effects of a 
merger. First, the focus is on output in addition to price. Together, the two dimensions 
provide a fuller picture of the competitive effects of the merger and allow us to comment on 
overall consumer welfare (Richard 2003; Werden et al. 1991). Second, traditional analysis 
usually considers all competing markets to be the same. However, it is likely that the merging 
airlines exert different market-power and efficiency effects depending on the type of 
competing market. This paper makes a distinction between hub and non-hub in the analysis of 
competing markets. It is well known that network airlines use hubs to maximize traffic flows 
(Brueckner and Spiller 1994). The merging of those hub operations in markets in which they 
compete can potentially affect the firms’ market power and efficiencies differently relative to 
operations in competing non-hub markets. Third, we also evaluate markets in which potential 
competition is eliminated. As Kwoka and Shumilkina (2010) and Le (2016) have 
documented, mergers that eliminate potential competition have a significant adverse effect on 
price and output. The US/AA merger is particularly concerning in this respect because the 
number of markets with potential competition is much larger than the number of markets with 
actual competition, suggesting that the potential adverse effects can be serious. 
The analysis yields two main findings. First, there are significant procompetitive effects in 
markets in which actual competition was eliminated, particularly where both endpoints of 
these markets are major hubs of the merging airlines. Much harm however comes from 
connecting routes in non-hub and one-hub markets. Second, the loss of potential competition 
is harmful for price and output overall, but the harm is greater in markets associated with US 
Airways hubs or markets in which it was the potential competitor. 
These findings suggest that even though this merger is procompetitive in markets in which 
actual competition was eliminated, it is important to distinguish between hub and non-hub 
markets because not all effects are procompetitive. With respect to potential competition, this 
merger has been quite harmful. Given that there are almost twice as many markets with 
potential competition as markets with actual competition, the harm is more serious. 
In prospective evaluation of airline mergers, policy makers are often more concerned 
about the elimination of actual competition than potential competition. In addition, 
consideration of efficiencies has to be merger-specific and verifiable. These findings however 
suggest that eliminating potential competition can be more serious than eliminating actual 
competition but that merger-specific efficiencies can come from competing markets 
associated with the airlines’ major hubs.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section describes the data, then 
presents descriptive statistics of the affected markets and the empirical model. Section 3 
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discusses the baseline results, performs several variations and sensitivity checks. Section 4 
concludes.  
2    Data, Descriptive Statistics, and Model 
2.1      Data 
The main dataset is the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) collected by the 
Bureau of Transportation Statistics. This survey is released quarterly and represents a 10 
percent sample of domestic airline tickets reported by the carriers. The unit of analysis is at 
the route-carrier-quarter-year2 level, where a route is defined as a combination of the origin 
airport, destination airport, and any connections. An airline market is defined as a 
unidirectional combination of the origin airport and destination airport. An example of a 
ticket is AA: JFK-ORD-LAX, where the passenger is flying with American Airlines (AA) 
departing from New York (JFK) to Los Angeles (LAX) with a connection in Chicago (ORD). 
In this case, the airline market is New York-Los Angeles (JFK-LAX) but the route is a 
connecting route (JFK-ORD-LAX). If US competed with AA in this market prior to their 
merger, then this market is affected by the merger because it eliminates US as a direct 
competitor to AA.  Defining an airline market this way is common in the literature.  
Information on the identities of the merging airlines and the origins and destinations they 
serve allows us to identify all markets affected by the merger. Several standard filters are 
applied to the data: ticket prices that are unreliable, missing, less than $25, or greater than 
$1,500 are excluded; itineraries associated with Alaska or Hawaii are excluded; only coach-
class tickets are included; routes with less than twenty passengers are excluded; and prices for 
roundtrip tickets are divided by two. 
As suggested by Carlton et al (2019), the selection of the pre- and postmerger windows 
should reflect periods of independent decision-making. For the pre-merger period, we use the 
first and second quarters of 2012. Since talks of the US/AA merger did not start until August 
31, 2012, and the boards of both airlines did not approve the merger until February 13, 2013, 
the chosen pre-merger periods should be before August 31, 2012. The merger process took 
about two-and-a-half years to complete. On October 17, 2015, US flew its last flight and 
officially retired its brand to complete its integration with AA. For the postmerger period, we 
use the first and second quarters of 2016.  
 
2  There are three carriers reported in the data—reporting carrier, ticketing carrier, and operating carrier.   
The analysis uses the operating carrier because this is the airline that actually transports the 
passengers.  The reporting carrier submits the ticket information to the Office of Airline Information 
and ticketing carrier the airline that issues the flight reservation.  
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2.2      Markets Affected by the Merger 
The relationship between the merging airlines and the markets they serve can be categorized 
as follows: (i) Actual markets are markets served by American and US Airways prior to their 
merger. (ii) Potential markets are markets served by American or US Airways with the other 
being a potential competitor. A potential competitor does not serve the market but is present 
at one or both endpoints of the market. Hence, the merger will eliminate one of the airlines as 
the potential competitor. Because they do not directly compete in these markets, the number 
of actual competitors is unchanged. (iii) None refers to markets served by American or US 
Airways but in which there is no potential competition from the other. While these markets 
are related to the airlines, they are unaffected by the merger because actual or potential 
competition is unchanged. (iv) Control markets are markets that neither American nor US 
Airways serves. These markets are unaffected by the merger and unrelated to the airlines.  
Table 1 summarizes these variables and provides the number of markets related to each 
category as well as the mean market price and number of passengers. US and AA directly 
compete in 3,254 markets with an average price of $166 and 210 passengers per market. 
There are almost twice as many markets with potential competition: 6,326. Even though the 
mean number of passengers is greater in actual markets, in aggregate there are more 
passengers in potential markets, suggesting the merger has a larger effect in such markets than 
in actual markets for the same change in price. 
Table 1: Number of Markets Affected by the Merger 
 
 
Variables 
 
 
Definitions 
No. of 
markets 
Mean 
market 
price 
Mean 
number of 
passengers 
ACTUAL American and US Airways overlap markets 3,254 $166.30 210.22 
POTENTIAL American or US Airways with other potential 6,326 $166.04 118.82 
NONE American or US Airways with no potential 47 $151.49 75.91 
CONTROL Neither American nor US Airways 7,544 $159.97 122 
TOTAL  17,171 $162.54 140 
2.3      Empirical Model 
The baseline reduced-form model is as follows: 
ln (𝑦௜௝௧) = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡௧  +  𝛽ଶ𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡௧ × 𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑈𝐴𝐿௠  +  𝛽ଷ𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡௧ × 𝑃𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐿௠ 
            + 𝛽ସ𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡௧ × 𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐸௠  +  𝑋𝛽௖௢௡௧௥௢௟௦ + 𝜂௜௝ + 𝜈௧ + 𝜀௜௝௧   (1) 
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The dependent variable 𝑦௜௝௧  is either 𝑝௜௝௧  for the price regression or 𝑞௜௝௧  for the output 
regression, where 𝑝௜௝௧ is the ticket price on route i served by carrier j at time t and 𝑞௜௝௧ is the 
total number of passengers traveling on ijt. Market dummy variables for actual and potential 
competition are denoted as 𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑈𝐴𝐿௠  and 𝑃𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐿௠ . The dummy variable 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡௧ 
indicates the postmerger period. The excluded dummy variable is 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿௠. The estimates 
𝛽ଶ and 𝛽ଷ isolate the price and output effects of the merger in markets in which actual and 
potential competition are eliminated. Since 𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐸௠ comprises markets related to the merging 
airlines in which no potential or actual competition is affected, the estimate 𝛽ସ is expected to 
be statistically insignificant. The variable X is a vector of additional controls:  
(i) Market concentration measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The 
calculation of HHI holds the market shares of the merging carriers fixed at the 
pre-merger level. Any changes in HHI after the merger are due to changes in the 
shares of the nonmerging carriers.  
(ii) hub (hub size) counts number of airports that the carrier connects with the origin 
airport of a market. The presence of an airline in a market is considered more 
dominant if the airline connects with a large number of other airports.  
(iii) pop (market size) is the geometric mean of the market’s population. 
(iv) income is the geometric mean of the market’s per capita income3. 
(v) distance is the nonstop distance (in miles) between the origin and destination 
airports. 
(vi) nonstop indicates that the route has zero connections. 
(vii) tourist (tourist destinations) indicates markets associated with Florida or Nevada. 
(viii) slot indicates airports associated with John F. Kennedy, LaGuardia, or Reagan 
National.  
(ix) Route-carrier fixed effects and time fixed effects are 𝜂௜௝ and 𝜈௧.  
Before estimating equation (1), we need to verify that the common-trend assumption 
holds, because the difference-in-difference approach requires of the control markets 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿௠ that (i) they are unrelated to the merger and the airlines; and (ii) their pre-merger 
price and output trends are similar to those of the affected markets. To test for this common 
trend, the following fixed-effects model is estimated in which the pre-merger time trend, 
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑௧, is interacted with the relevant markets’ dummy variables: 
 
 
3 Population and income statistics are from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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ln൫𝑦௜௝௧൯ = 𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑௧  + 𝛼ଶ𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑௧ × 𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑈𝐴𝐿௠ 
       +𝛼ଷ𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑௧ × 𝑃𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐿௠ + 𝛼ସ𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑௧ × 𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐸௠ + 𝜆௜௝ + 𝜇௜௝௧ (2) 
Equation (2) is estimated using the pre-merger data. Since 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿௠  are the excluded 
markets, estimates 𝛼ଶ  and 𝛼ଷ  indicate how price and output trends in actual and potential 
markets are changing in relation to those in control markets. If their trends are in common 
with the control, these estimates should be statistically insignificant. The results are presented 
in table 2. On average, price and output in the control markets are increasing about 2.4 
percent and 12.7 percent per quarter. Estimates for actual and potential markets are close to 
zero and not statistically significant, suggesting that price and output trends in those markets 
do not differ from those of the control. These results suggest that the control markets are 
likely to be reasonable candidates to help account for common changes that are unrelated to 
the merger.  
3.      Estimation Results 
This section discusses the baseline results and variations to the model including (i) the 
distinction between hub and non-hub overlap markets; (ii) the identity and presence of the 
potential competitor; and (iii) the differences between nonstop and connecting routes.  Based 
on the Hausman test, the fixed-effects (FE) model is preferred. The FE model controls for all 
time-invariant variables, but results of the random-effects (RE) model are also included to 
allow for the inclusion of these variables and for comparison with the FE estimates.  
3.1      Baseline Results 
Table 3 reports price and output estimates and their standard errors side by side for ease of 
comparison. Estimates on post are quite similar for the two models in the price regression but 
slightly different in the output regression. They suggest that after the merger, price and output 
in markets not affected by the merger (control markets) increase about 17 percent4 and 23 
percent.  
We now turn to the effects of the merger in markets with actual competition between AA 
and US. Estimates on the variable post*ACTUAL suggest that relative to the control markets, 
price increases about 3.2 percent (t=3.56) and output decreases about 8 percent (t=4.87). The 
direction of price and output changes and their statistical significance strongly suggest that the 
merger is anticompetitive in these markets because a  
 
4 Since FE is the preferred model, we will use those estimates to calculate percentage changes, which is 
100(𝑒.ଵ଺଴ − 1).  
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Table 2: Common-Trend Test 
Variable ln(𝑝) ln(𝑞) 
Estimate SE Estimate SE 
pretrend 
 
.024* .010 .127** .012 
pretrend*ACTUAL 
 
.007 .011 .002 .014 
pretrend*POTENTIAL 
 
.001 .012 .022 .015 
pretrend*NONE 
 
-.101 .108 -.094 .127 
constant 4.86** .006 4.21** .008 
𝑅തଶ .44 .88 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the route-carrier level.  *p<.05, **p<.01 
 
competing airline is eliminated. The magnitudes of these estimates are also noteworthy. Even 
though the price increases for this merger are modest compared to previous mergers, which 
saw an average increase of about 6.5 percent (Kwoka 2015), the larger percentage decrease in 
output indicates that the adverse effects on consumer welfare are likely to be sizeable in 
aggregate.  
In markets in which potential competition is eliminated, estimates on the variable 
post*POTENTIAL suggest that price also increases (4.3 percent, t=4.33) and output also 
decreases (6.3 percent, t=3.61). These results suggest that the merger is also anticompetitive 
in these markets even though neither market concentration nor the number of actual 
competitors has changed; the merger simply eliminates the threat of entry by one of the 
airlines. While not identical, the sizes of these estimates are similar to those for actual 
competition. Statistical tests on these estimates indicate that they are not statistically different, 
suggesting that eliminating potential competition for this merger is just as severe as 
eliminating actual competition. Given that the number of markets with potential competition 
is almost twice that of markets with actual competition, the adverse effects in aggregate are 
certainly larger. While one might expect that the effects of eliminating potential competition 
should be less than eliminating actual competition, these results are in part due to combining 
nonstop and connecting routes.  We will make this distinction and other variations in later 
sections.  
For markets without actual or potential competition, estimates on the variable post*NONE 
are not statistically significant, as expected. Although these estimates may not seem relevant 
for the current analysis, they are important because they provide evidence that what we found 
on actual and potential competition is most likely due to greater market power and not higher 
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costs; if costs had risen, we would most likely see higher prices and lower output in these 
markets as well.  
Table 3: Baseline Regression Results on Price and Output 
 
Variable 
RE FE RE FE 
ln(𝑝) ln(𝑝) ln(𝑞) ln(𝑞) 
post 
 
.150** 
(.009)
.160** 
(.015)
.182** 
(.018)
.210** 
(.027) 
post*ACTUAL 
 
.032** 
(.006)
.032** 
(.009)
−.061** 
(.011)
−.083** 
(.017) 
post*POTENTIAL 
 
.041** 
(.006)
.042** 
(.009)
−.036** 
(.012)
−.065** 
(.018) 
post*NONE 
 
.082+ 
(.048)
−.001 
(.080)
.100 
(.101)
.140 
(.156) 
ACTUAL 
 
−.099** 
(.006)
 .285** 
(.016)
 
POTENTIAL 
 
−.073** 
(.005)
 .171** 
(.013)
 
NONE 
 
−.132** 
(.031)
 .216** 
(.075)
 
ln(HHI) 
 
−.007* 
(.003)
.027* 
(.010)
.061** 
(.010)
.076** 
(.023) 
hub 
 
.002** 
(.0001)
.002** 
(.0002)
.002** 
(.0002)
.001+ 
(.0005) 
ln(pop) 
 
−.022 
(.060)
−.056 
(.099)
−.255** 
(.120)
−.219 
(.178) 
ln(income) 
 
−.157 
(.207)
−.342 
(.346)
−1.67** 
(.431)
−1.84** 
(.643) 
ln(distance) 
 
.281** 
(.003)
 −.351** 
(.011)
 
nonstop 
 
−.090** 
(.003)
 1.17** 
(.015)
 
tourist 
 
−.131** 
(.0128)
 .214** 
(.040)
 
slot 
 
−.072 
(.071)
 −.159 
(.245)
 
constant 
 
5.09* 
(2.33)
9.02* 
(3.93)
24.83** 
(4.83)
26.28** 
(7.26) 
 
𝑅തଶ 
 
.30 
 
.42 
 
.40 
 
.82 
Note: Hausman test favors the fixed-effects model. Standard errors are clustered at the 
route-carrier level. Fixed effects for carrier, origin airport, destination airport, and quarter 
are included in the RE model. +p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01 
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3.2      Hub Presence and Ownership 
This section investigates two variations with respect to actual competition: (i) how it affects 
hub markets and non-hub markets; and (ii) whether there is a difference when AA is the hub 
owner versus US as the hub owner5. The effects of the merger can be pro- or anticompetitive 
in hub markets because even though the merger eliminates an actual competitor, it can also 
lead to greater efficiency and traffic flows from optimizing the airlines’ combined hub 
networks. A hub market is defined as follows: 
(1) ACTUAL_1HUB is a competing market in which the origin airport or destination 
airport of the market is a hub associated with either AA or US. In this case, only one 
of the market’s endpoints is a hub airport. 
(2) ACTUAL_2HUB is a competing market in which the origin airport and destination 
airport are hubs associated with either AA or US. Both endpoints are hub airports in 
this case. Making a distinction between one- and two-hub markets is potentially 
important because the distinction may influence how the merger affects traffic, cost, 
and competition. 
(3) ACTUAL_0HUB is a competing market in which neither the origin nor destination 
airport is a hub. This variable indicates non-hub markets. 
The first two columns of table 4 report the FE results. The effects on price are statistically 
insignificant for both one- and two-hub markets. The effects on output however differ. Output 
decreases about 6 percent (t=2.84) in markets with one hub but increases 16.4 percent 
(t=2.59) in markets in which both endpoints are hub airports. The increase in output suggests 
the merger is not anticompetitive in these two-hub markets even though one of the airlines is 
eliminated, suggesting in turn that efficiencies gains from hub optimization likely outweigh 
the increase in market power. Most of the anticompetitive effects of the merger are coming 
from one-hub markets and non-hub markets; perhaps efficiencies are less likely there. These 
results suggest the importance of including output in a merger analysis and suggest that the 
type of actual market is an important determinant of the competitive effects of a merger. 
The second variation is on whether the identity of the airline that owns the hub matters. 
While the hub owner is often considered the stronger competitive force in a market, its 
competitive effects may not be symmetric.   
 
 
5 US Airways hubs include Charlotte Douglas, Philadelphia International, Phoenix–Sky Harbor, and 
Reagan National. American hubs a are Charlotte Douglas, Philadelphia International, Phoenix–Sky 
Harbor, Reagan National, Chicago–O'Hare, Dallas/Fort Worth, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, and 
LaGuardia.  
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Table 4: Hub Presence and Ownership 
 
 
Variable 
1 vs 2 HUB US vs AA HUB 
 
ln(𝑝) 
 
ln(𝑞) 
 
ln(𝑝) 
 
ln(𝑞) 
post*ACTUAL_1HUB .011 
(.011) 
−.062** 
(.022) 
  
post*ACTUAL_2HUB −.042 
(.028) 
.152** 
(.058) 
  
post*ACTUAL_0HUB .046** 
(.010) 
−.105** 
(.018) 
.046** 
(.010) 
−.105** 
(.018) 
post*ACTUAL_US 
 
  .079** 
(.015) 
.040 
(.031) 
post*ACTUAL_AA 
 
  −.025* 
(.013) 
−.057* 
(.025) 
post 
 
.168** 
(.015) 
.196** 
(.028) 
.159** 
(.015) 
.195** 
(.028) 
post*POTENTIAL 
 
.042** 
(.010) 
−.064** 
(.018) 
.042** 
(010) 
−.064** 
(.018) 
post*NONE 
 
−.001 
(.080) 
.140 
(.156) 
−.004 
(.080) 
.139 
(.156) 
ln(HHI) 
 
.023* 
(.010) 
.081** 
(.023) 
.020* 
(.010) 
.079** 
(.023) 
hub 
 
.002** 
(.0003) 
.001+ 
(.0006) 
.002** 
(.0003) 
.001+ 
(.0006) 
ln(pop) 
 
−.068 
(.099) 
−.199 
(.177) 
−.090 
(.099) 
−.211 
(.177) 
ln(income) 
 
−.550 
(.350) 
−1.45* 
(.646) 
−.296 
(.351) 
−1.42* 
(.649) 
constant 
 
11.43** 
(3.97) 
21.83** 
(7.29) 
9.03* 
(3.98) 
21.66** 
(7.32) 
𝑅തଶ .42 .82 .42 .82 
.  
That is, a market associated with a US hub that AA competes in can potentially differ from an 
AA hub that US competes in since they may not necessarily offer the same level of service at 
each other’s hubs.  The variable ACTUAL_US indicates markets in which US is the hub 
owner that AA competes in and ACTUAL_AA indicates AA hubs that US competes in.  
The last two columns of table 4 report the results. Notice the estimates on the variable 
post*ACTUAL_0HUB are the same as before because they are non-hub markets. In US hub 
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markets that AA competes in, prices increase about 8.2 percent with output unchanged; but in 
AA hub markets that US competes in, output decreases 5.5 percent with price slightly 
decreasing (2.5 percent). The differences in the price and output effects between US and AA 
hub markets suggest that AA was an important pricing constraint on US hub markets but that 
the greater output constraint came from US’s presence in AA hub markets.  
In sum, hub markets and ownership are important in affecting merger outcomes. 
Specifically, when both market endpoints are hubs of the merging airlines, the merger is not 
necessarily anticompetitive, because it can lead to greater traffic between those hubs. The 
price and output effects of a merger can differ because the extent to which the airlines exert 
competitive pressure on each other before the merger depends on whether the hub is US or 
AA. 
3.3      Potential-Competitor Identity and Endpoint Presence 
We investigate two variations relating to the effects of potential competition: (i) the identity 
of the potential competitor and (ii) whether it has presence at one or both endpoints of the 
market. Potential competition so far has been defined as having presence at one or both 
endpoints of the market, but no distinction has been made regarding the identity of the 
potential competitor. Knowing the identity of the potential competitor can provide evidence 
on who exerts more competitive pressure. The variable POTENTIAL_US indicates markets in 
which US is the potential competitor of AA. These markets are served by AA, but US has 
presence at one or both endpoints. Similarly, POTENTIAL_AA indicates AA is the potential 
competitor in US markets.  
The first two columns of table 5 report the results. In AA markets in which US is the 
potential competitor, price increases 4.6 percent and output decreases 11.94 percent. In US 
markets in which AA is the potential competitor, price increases 3.9 percent but output is 
unchanged. The output estimates are statistically different, but price estimates are not. These 
results indicate that while both airlines exert similar pricing constraint on each other, US (vis-
à-vis AA) exerts the stronger output effect. 
The second variation is on whether the potential competitor has presence at one or both 
endpoints of the market. The variable POTENTIAL_ONE indicates either AA’s or US’s 
presence at one endpoint and POTENTIAL_TWO indicates presence at both endpoints. The 
results indicate that prices increase 5.3 percent and output decreases 10.6 percent in the case 
of having presence at one endpoint. The price and output effects are slightly lower in the case 
of two endpoints: 4 percent increase and 5.2 percent decrease. The output estimates are 
statistically different, but the price estimates are not, suggesting that the output effect is 
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stronger when the potential competitor has presence at one endpoint but the price effect is the 
same regardless of endpoint presence. Since much of the adverse effect on output comes from 
US as the potential competitor, suggesting that US exerts the stronger competitive constraint 
on AA than vice versa.   
In sum, these two variations suggest that the identity of the potential competitor matters 
more than whether it has presence at one or both endpoints of the market. Particularly, when 
the potential competitor is US, the decline in output is greater than when the potential 
competitor is AA, and US does not need to have presence at both market endpoints to have 
this stronger effect. These results suggest that eliminating potential competition may be more 
harmful than eliminating actual competition because the number of markets affected is larger 
and the adverse effects on price and output are more persistent.  
Table 5: Identity and Endpoint Presence 
 
Variable 
US vs AA ONE vs TWO 
 
ln(𝑝) 
 
ln(𝑞) 
 
ln(𝑝) 
 
ln(𝑞) 
post*POTENTIAL_US .046** 
(.012)
−.126** 
(.021)
  
post*POTENTIAL_AA 
 
.039** 
(.011)
−.016 
(.020)
  
post*POTENTIAL_ONE 
 
  .052** 
(.014)
−.112* 
(.025) 
post*POTENTIAL_TWO 
 
  .039** 
(.010)
−.053** 
(.019) 
post 
 
.161** 
(.015)
.202** 
(.028)
.161** 
(.015)
.208** 
(.028) 
post*ACTUAL 
 
.032** 
(.009)
−.084** 
(.017)
.032** 
(.009)
−.083** 
(.017) 
post*NONE 
 
−.002 
(.080)
.151 
(.158)
−.00001 
(.080)
.135 
(.155) 
ln(HHI) 
 
.027* 
(.010)
.075** 
(.023)
.027* 
(.010)
.076** 
(.023) 
hub 
 
.002** 
(.0002)
.001+ 
(.0006)
.002** 
(.0003)
.001+ 
(.0006) 
ln(pop) 
 
−.064 
(.100)
−.092 
(.181)
−.043 
(.100)
−.279 
(.178) 
ln(income) 
 
−.351 
(.347)
−1.68** 
(.642)
−.358 
(.349)
−1.77** 
(.643) 
constant 
 
9.23** 
(3.94)
22.88** 
(7.28)
9.02* 
(3.93)
26.27** 
(7.25) 
𝑅തଶ .42 .82 .42 .82 
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3.4      Nonstop Versus Connecting Routes  
Since market competition in routes that require a layover can differ from those that do not, 
this section makes a distinction between nonstop and connecting routes.  Columns 1A and 1B 
in Table 6 reports the baseline results for nonstop and connecting routes along with two 
variations that were discussed earlier. To save space, only the estimates of interest are 
reported from the various regressions.  We discuss these results first, and then turn to several 
sensitivity checks in the next section. 
For nonstop routes, the estimates on post*ACTUAL indicate that overall price decreases 
about 5 percent (t=3.11) and output increases 5.9 percent (t=1.57), but the latter result is not 
statistically significant. If we disaggregate this variable into various hub markets, price 
decreases the most in two-hub markets with 12.5 percent; prices decrease 5.8 percent in one-
hub and 3.3 percent in non-hub markets. The effects on output are not statistically significant 
for one- and non-hub markets, but increase substantially (by more than 50 percent) in two-hub 
markets. These results provide clearer evidence that most of the procompetitive effects are 
from nonstop routes in markets in which both endpoints are hubs of the merging airlines. The 
adverse effects are from connecting routes with an overall price increase of 5.7 percent 
(t=5.09) and output decrease of 11.2 percent (t=6.21). Non-hub and one-hub markets are the 
most affected, with prices 6.5 and 4.2 percent higher and output 12.3 and 9.6 percent lower. 
The effects in two-hub markets are not statistically significant.  
In the case of potential competition, output decreases for both connecting and nonstop 
routes, with the latter having the larger decrease (5.2 percent vs. 9.3 percent). Much of these 
reductions (17.6 percent nonstop and 11 percent connecting) comes from markets in which 
US is the potential competitor rather than AA. Price effects are not statistically significant for 
nonstop routes, but prices are higher by 4.8 percent for connecting routes. In this case, the 
price increases are similar when either US or AA is the potential competitor, with increases of 
5.4 and 4.4 percent.  
In sum, the foregoing analysis makes clear that in nonstop two-hub markets in which the 
merging airlines previously competed, the effects have been procompetitive. Connecting 
routes in one- and non-hub markets are where most of the adverse effects are coming from. 
The elimination of potential competition raises price and reduces output for nonstop and 
connecting routes, particularly those in which US was the potential competitor.  
3.5      Sensitivity Analysis 
Although the premerger price and output trends of the control routes are similar to the 
affected routes, the average number of passengers on a route is lower, and the average route 
distance is also shorter relative to the affected routes. To check for the robustness of the 
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baseline results, the control routes are filtered such that their route passengers and distances 
are similar.   
Table 6: Nonstop vs. Connecting Routes & Sensitivity Checks 
 NONSTOP ROUTES 
 1A: Baseline 2A: Passenger 3A: Distance 
Variable ln(𝑝) ln(𝑞) ln(𝑝) ln(𝑞) ln(𝑝) ln(𝑞) 
post*ACTUAL 
 
−.050** 
(.016) 
.057 
(.036) 
−.062** 
(.017) 
.079* 
(.034) 
−.058** 
(.018) 
.064+ 
(.034) 
post*ACTUAL_1HUB 
 
−.060** 
(.019) 
.056 
(.045) 
−.073** 
(.020) 
.079+ 
(.043) 
−.069** 
(.020) 
.065 
(.043) 
post*ACTUAL_2HUB 
 
−.127** 
(.043) 
.420** 
(.118) 
−.140** 
(.043) 
.446** 
(.117) 
−.137** 
(.043) 
.432** 
(.117) 
post*ACTUAL_0HUB 
 
−.034+ 
(.018) 
.019 
(.042) 
−.045* 
(.019) 
.039 
(.039) 
−.040* 
(.019) 
.024 
(.040) 
post*POTENTIAL 
 
.028 
(.018) 
−.098** 
(.037) 
.015 
(.019) 
−.074* 
(.036) 
.019 
(.020) 
−.088* 
(.036) 
post*POTENTIAL_US 
 
.022 
(.024) 
−.193** 
(.048) 
.010 
(.025) 
−.172** 
(.047) 
.014 
(.025) 
−.187** 
(.047) 
post*POTENTIAL_AA 
 
.032 
(.020) 
−.044 
(.044) 
.018 
(.021) 
−.019 
(.042) 
.021 
(.021) 
−.033 
(.042) 
       
 CONNECTING ROUTES 
 1B: Baseline 2B: Passenger 3B: Distance 
Variable ln(𝑝) ln(𝑞) ln(𝑝) ln(𝑞) ln(𝑝) ln(𝑞) 
post*ACTUAL 
 
.055** 
(.011) 
−.119** 
(.019) 
.052** 
(.012) 
−.100** 
(.020) 
.055** 
(.013) 
−.104** 
(.021) 
post*ACTUAL_1HUB 
 
.041** 
(.014) 
−.101** 
(.024) 
.039* 
(.015) 
−.083** 
(.025) 
.042** 
(.015) 
−.086** 
(.025) 
post*ACTUAL_2HUB 
 
.00002 
(.036) 
.021 
(.062) 
−.003 
(.037) 
.038 
(.062) 
.0003 
(.037) 
.035 
(.062) 
post*ACTUAL_0HUB 
 
.063** 
(.011) 
−.131** 
(.020) 
.060** 
(.013) 
−.113** 
(.021) 
.063** 
(.013) 
−.116** 
(.021) 
post*POTENTIAL 
 
.047** 
(.012) 
−.053** 
(.020) 
.045** 
(.013) 
−.034 
(.021) 
.048** 
(.013) 
−.037+ 
(.022) 
post*POTENTIAL_US 
 
.053** 
(.014) 
−.117** 
(.023) 
.050** 
(.015) 
−.099** 
(.024) 
.053** 
(.015) 
−.102** 
(.025) 
post*POTENTIAL_AA 
 
.043** 
(.013) 
.005 
(.022) 
.040** 
(.014) 
.024 
(.023) 
.043** 
(.015) 
.021 
(.023) 
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 For nonstop routes, the definition of similar passengers is that the number of passengers in 
the control must be at least 10 percent the average number of passengers in the affected.  For 
connecting routes, it is at least 30 percent.  Results of this filter are shown in columns 2A and 
2B.   Columns 3A and 3B add a distance filter, where the control distances for nonstop routes 
are at least 20 percent the average distance of affected and 30 percent for connecting routes.  
These filters have brought the control and affected closer in these dimensions but they have 
also made their market sizes and average prices closer as well.  This approach is similar to the 
one taken by Carlton et al (2019).    
Across all specifications, the direction and statistical significance of these price and output 
estimates are basically consistent with the baseline results.  The magnitude of these estimates 
are however slightly different for actual and potential competition.  Price and output estimates 
on the variable post*ACTUAL are slightly larger (in absolute value) for nonstop routes but 
somewhat smaller for connecting routes particularly on output.  These results are consistent 
when disaggregated to various hub markets, suggesting that the procompetitive effect is 
actually stronger for nonstop routes but the adverse effect in connecting routes is smaller.  For 
potential competition, the output estimates on the variable post*POTENTIAL are slightly 
smaller for both nonstop and connecting routes but the price effects are similar with the 
baseline results even when disaggregated to US versus AA as the potential competitor. 
These sensitivity checks suggest the importance of using similar control routes to compare 
because the baseline has slightly underestimated the impact in actual markets but 
overestimated in potential markets.  
4.      Conclusions 
This paper evaluates the price and output effects of the US/AA merger in markets in which 
the airlines previously competed directly and indirectly. We found that the merger decreases 
price and significantly increases output in competing markets associated with their hubs, but 
it is quite harmful in markets in which they indirectly competed, particularly when that 
competitor is US. While these results are specific to this merger, they suggest that any 
postmerger analysis should consider how output is affected in addition to price, make a 
distinction between competing hub and non-hub markets, and consider the loss of potential 
competition, particularly when a large number of these markets are affected. 
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